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IN DEFENSE OF A DOUBLE
STANDARD IN THE RULES OF
ETHICS: A CRITICAL
REEVALUATION OF THE CHINESE
WALL AND VICARIOUS
DISQUALIFICATION•

[T]he advocate is bound in honor, as well as duty, to
disclose to the client at the time of the retainer, every
circumstance of his own connection with the parties or
prior relation to the controversy, which can or may infiuence his determination in the selection of him for the
office . ... No man can be supposed to be indifferent to
the knowledge of facts, which work directly on his interests, or bear on the freedom of his choice of counsel. 1
[I]t should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from
one association to another several times in their careers.
If the concept of imputed disqualification were defined
with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one
practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. 2
The "Chinese wall," or reliance upon internal devices for protecting client confidences, as a defense against vicarious disqualification of law firms presents a curious double standard. At present, the defense is available only where a government attorney
* I would like to thank Professor Richard Lempert, who encouraged me to delve into
the archives of the Kutak Commission; Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Theodore
Schneyer, and Monroe Freedman, who assisted in locating the materials; and Olavi
Maru, librarian at the American Bar Foundation, who provided access to the materials
and a quiet workspace.
1. G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 45-46 (1854).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983).
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joins a private firm after leaving public service; where a private
attorney moves from firm to firm, no Chinese wall defense to
firm disqualification is available. The arbiters of the ethics of
the legal profession, the bar and the courts, have recognized the
defense to protect former government employees and their law
firm employers from disqualification because of potential conflicts of interest. 3
Firms may enter into representation involving matters in
which one of thel firm's current partners or associates participated as a public servant. In doing so, firms may protect against
the violation of client confidences by building a Chinese wall.
Where a private attorney changes firms and encounters a similar
conflict of interest in successive representation, he and his firm
must obtain the former client's consent to continue the representation or risk disqualification.• Only recently have some
courts suggested that a Chinese wall might provide an acceptable defense to such disqualification-termed "vicarious" or
"imputed" disqualification-of the firm. 11 A more receptive attitude toward the Chinese wall for the private attorney raises
questions about the process and justifications for changes in ethical standards in the legal profession and leaves law firms unsure
of the risks that they face in hiring new attorneys and in accepting new clients.
Examination of the ethical standard for vicarious disqualification of law firms,6 and the exception for the properly screened
3. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see also ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 342 (1975) [hereinafter Formal Opinion
342), reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.11 (1983).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.l0(d) (1983).
5. See, e.g., E.Z. Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting
the Chinese wall defense because .the wall was not properly in place); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that special institutional mechanisms
must be in place to avoid even inadvertent sharing of confidences) (citing LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983)). The disqualification is vicarious
because it affects the firm solely because of the association of the individual attorney.
6. Each emendation of the legal profession's ethical standards has considered a variety of conflicts of interest in the attorney-client relationship. One common concern has
been the attorney who faces a former client as an adversary in a civil matter related to
the former representation. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code),
originally adopted in 1969, only indirectly addressed such a conflict. See MODEL CoDE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (addressing confidentiality); id. Canon 9
(discussing appearance of impropriety); id. DR 5-105 (warning against impairment of
independent professional judgment); id. DR 9-101(B) (referring to former public employee); id. EC 4-5 (exhorting against use of information to the disadvantage of the client); id. EC 4-6 (urging preservation of confidences after termination of employment); id.
EC 9-3 (offering example of former public employee and matter of substantial responsi-
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employee, 7 reveals the interdependence of the organized bar and
the courts in formulating the code of ethical conduct for the profession. Although the standards that courts apply will vary, 8
those adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) generally
serve as a guide. 9 Yet the bar and the courts have separate roles
in defining and modifying the standards. 10
bility). The consequence or risk of such a conflict lies in potential disqualification for the
individual attorney or the imputed or vicarious disqualification of the firm.
7. The firm builds a Chinese wall to isolate an attorney who may contaminate its
representation of a new client because of his former involvement with the client's adversary. Today, most firms routinely have in place at least minimum screening devices,
hardly analogous to the Great Wall of China, to prevent a number of potential conflicts.
See Keane, Microcomputers Can Resolve Conflicts of Interest, Legal Times, June 10,
1985, at 13, col. 1 (discussing the basic requirements for a computerized screening
system).
The conflict of interest at issue is inherent in successive, not concurrent, representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); Temple, Subsequent
Representation and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: An Evaluation of Rules
1.9 and 1.10, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161 (detailing the distinction); Note, The Chinese Wall
Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980); Developments in
the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law) (explaining the distinction). Cf. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1 (1983) (discussing subsequent representation in criminal matters); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984) (raising similar conflicts growing out of class actions), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
Discussion here is limited to conflicts of interest of private attorneys in successive representation in civil actions.
8. See Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975); see
also O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: Methods for Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability and Disqualification, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,
696-97 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
[N]o general federal law governs the conduct of attorneys . . . . Some federal
district courts have adopted the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code or CPR) by local rule; others have relied upon their
inherent power to control the conduct of lawyers appearing before them.... An
additional factor complicating ethical decisions by attorneys is the numerous revisions the CPR has undergone over the years. Because of these changes, the
version of the Code found authoritative by some courts may differ significantly
in critical provisions from the Code adhered to by others.
9. O'Dea, supra note 8, at 696-97; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994
(1986) ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association Standards
and the like, ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides."
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))).
10. In considering a motion to disqualify, the federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York raised an important distinction between the role of the courts and
the role served by a code of professional responsibility:
While the CPR is a source by which the courts may be guided, it is not the final
word on disqualification. Courts are not policemen of the legal profession; that is
a matter for the disciplinary arm of the bar. Disqualification is granted to protect the integrity of the proceedings, not to monitor the ethics of attorneys' conduct. As the Second Circuit has noted,
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In the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model
Rules), the ABA adopted a straightforward, black letter rule on
vicarious disqualification; 11 the comment, however, left open
possible exceptions. 12 Thus, the standard for vicarious disqualification is ambiguous. Law firms have challenged the disqualification rule; 13 numerous commentators have criticized it. 14 Nevertheless, the relatively recent ratification of the Model Rules 1 r,
and the ongoing state-by-state consideration of the rules suggest
that abolition or even revision of the imputed disqualification
rule is unlikely.
The courts remain equivocal, suggesting the possibility of a
new standard but remaining reluctant to adopt one. Rather than
. . . The Code nevertheless will continue to provide guidance for the
courts in determining whether a case would be tainted by the participation of an attorney or firm.
USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1463 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981)).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983):
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about
whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 [Confidentiality of Information] and l.9(b) [matters substantially related) that is material to
the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has [confidential) information ..
12.
The Comment to Rule 1.10 indicates the firm intention of its draftsmen that a
pragmatic approach is necessary to the question of vicarious disqualification.
The comment also extends the analysis of Rule 1.10 to disqualified lawyers in
law firms generally, not only former government attorneys .... The rigid formalism underlying Canon 9's injunction against an "appearance of impropriety" is
strongly rejected in favor of a new philosophy of pragmatism which balances the
expectations of confidentiality of a former client against the importance of allowing a client the representation of his choice and promoting the mobility of
attorneys.
Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D. Del. 1986).
13. The courts have expressed distaste for the use of the motion to disqualify as a
litigation tactic by the former client. See Dalrymple v. National Bank & Trust Co., 615
F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (admonishing the courts to "be sensitive to tactical
considerations which may impel a party to seek disqualification of a particularly competent or formidable opponent"); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, the courts appear to be similarly unsympathetic to the firm that appeals
disqualification without having had any precautions in place.
14. See LaSalle Nat'! Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1983).
15. See infra note 39.
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adopting a single standard for an acceptable Chinese wall, some
courts have taken a case-by-case approach. 16 Most seem to be
taking one of two approaches: exploring the acceptability of a
further exception to imputed disqualification, or scrutinizing
proposed minimum standar~s for the Chinese wall that will
make the exception possible.
This Note suggests that no change is warranted at the present
time; courts should not adopt the Chinese wall defense to vicarious disqualification of private firms. The Chinese wall should,
however, continue to operate as an internal device for protection
of confidentiality. As such, it encourages firms to avoid disqualification by obtaining client consent to successive representation.
Neither the historical record of the work of the Commission on
the Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission),17 the empirical evidence currently available, nor the pragmatic arguments offered by many commentators justify an exception to, or modification of, the standard of imputed
disqualification. Part I examines the historical development of
the rule of vicarious disqualification, explaining the underlying
rationale for the rule, the position of those who favor the rule as
adopted in the Model Rules, and how the rule evolved with an
exception for attorneys leaving government service. Part II discusses the status of the Chinese wall as a defense to vicarious
disqualification, reviewing recent challenges to the present rule.
Finally, Part III assesses the prospects for, and wisdom of, a
change in the standard given the position that the courts have
taken, the process of change within the ABA, and the practical
problems of providing adequate guarantees against such conflicts of interest.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF VICARIOUS DISQUALIFICATION

The modern codes of professional responsibility for the legal
profession originated in written codes of the nineteenth century.18 Since the 1908 adoption of the Canons of Professional
16. See infra notes 61-64 & 111-20 and accompanying text. Yet the courts have been
remarkably consistent in suggesting criteria for a well-built wall.
17. The ABA established the Kutak Commission, with Robert J. Kutak serving as
chairman, to review the Code; the result was the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(the Model Rules). See infra note 39.
18. The forerunners of the contemporary codes of legal ethics in the United States
were Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment (1836), reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 338 (1955), and ALABAMA STATE BAR Ass'N, CooE
OF ETHICS (1887, 1899), reprinted in H. DRINKER, supra, at 352. These first systematic
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Ethics (the Canons), the ABA has regularly amended and revised the written standards. 19 The Model Rules followed only
thirteen years after the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). One reasonable explanation for
this shift was the changing nature of legal practice in the
1970's. 2 ° Firms became larger and more specialized. 21 Discussion
and revision of the standard regarding vicarious disqualification,
in particular, reveal the profession's sensitivity to changing conditions of practice. This Part examines the evolving vicarious
disqualification standard as reflected in the formulation of the
Model Rules.
A.

The Process of Change

Since adoption of the Canons, the first national code of ethics,
in 1908, the ABA has recognized changed perceptions of the ethical responsibilities of the legal profession through amendment
of the Canons and the adoption of the Code and Model Rules. 22
The process of revision involves extended discussion and negotiation. 23 The formal mechanism incorporates modifications
originating in opinions of the ABA and state bar associations,
and in state-adopted standards. Judicial opinions also influence
and modify the ethical standards. 2 •
formulations for the American legal profession became the model for the Canons of Professional Ethics (the Canons), the first national code of professional responsibility,
adopted in 1908. The original Canons consisted of 32 aspirational statements, with 15
more added over the next 29 years.
19. The ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility to rectify important omissions from the Canons, to make practical sanctions for violations more feasible, and to edit and modernize the standards. See Preface to MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
20. The ABA proceeded to revise and eventually adopt the Model Rules in place of
the Code after the Kutak Commission, charged with the revision, "concluded that piecemeal amendment of the Model Code would not sufficiently clarify the profession's ethical
responsibilities in light of changed conditions." Meserve, Chairman's Introduction to
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
21. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1355, 1366; see also Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of
Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1068 (1964).
22. See supra notes 17-20.
23. See Meserve, supra note 20.
24. One commentator questions the need for formal rules where "civil and criminal
law, the market, and the desire for good standing in one's community would remain,"
and points to the resourcefulness of the common law: "The Code, for example, said little
useful about successive conflicts of interest, yet courts readily proceeded to define them
and to fashion appropriate disqualification remedies." Gillers, What We Talked About
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The principles of loyalty to the client and protection of client
confidences underlie the ethical standards regarding conflicts of
interest in successive representation and vicarious disqualification.211 By imposing a threat of disqualification, the bar added an
incentive to avoid the temptation or accidental risk of violating
a client's confidences. The risk extended to the firm as well because of the presumption that lawyers associated together had
access to shared confidences. 26 The presumption shifted the burden of proof from the law firm seeking disqualification to the
firm facing disqualification. 27
Concerns regarding confidentiality and conflict of interest
have permeated every revision of the ethical standards of the
legal profession. One of the earliest statements of professional
ethics in America described the lawyer's obligation to inform his
client of potential conflicts with former clients. 28 The Canons, as
originally drafted, warned against subsequent conflicting representation, stressing the values of loyalty to the client and confidentiality.29 A 1937 amendment to the Canons related the conflict to the protection of confidences. The obligation to protect
confidentiality outlasts employment and might even require the
lawyer to refrain from undertaking conflicting employment. 30
The emphasis on confidentiality was at least partially related to
When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
243, 244 (1985) (footnote omitted).
25. See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J.
909 (1980) (discussing the principles of loyalty and confidentiality, their place in the
hierarchy of ethical values, and their impact on the lawyer's duty of candor to the court
and fairness to others); see also Ernie Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d
Cir. 1973) (stressing the value of the client's right to speak freely to chosen counsel and
the importance of avoiding even the appearance of impropriety). But see Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (fulfilling the
duty of absolute fidelity to the client's confidences does not require a blanket approach).
26. Note, supra note 7, at 682.
27. Id.
28. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 1, at 45-46.
29. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908): "The obligation to represent the
client with undivided fidelity snd not to divulge his secrets· or confidences forbids also
the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
30.
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyer's employment ... [and he should not] accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences ... to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there
are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of
his full duty to his former or to his new client.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1952) (as amended Sept. 30, 1937).
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the notion of loyalty to the client. 31 Other rationales for confidentiality have included protecting the integrity of the legal profession32 and encouraging clients to come forward with
information. 88
The Code adopted language similar to the original Canons,
emphasizing the protection of confidentiality8 " while voicing
concerns regarding the exercise of independent professional
judgmentu and the appearance of impropriety. 86 The Code,
however, made no specific reference to representation of a former client. At the time the ABA discarded the Code and
adopted the Model Rules, the ethical standards of the profession
called for lawyers and firms to avoid the appearance of impropriety by refraining from successive representation of clients in
substantially related matters. 37 The Code continues in force in
most states as the review process for the new rules gradually
gets underway. 88 States may choose to keep the familiar Code,
reject particular sections of the Model Rules-amending or retaining their old standard-or adopt the new standard.
The Model Rules 39 bring together, and attempt to deal expressly with, the issues of conflict of interest in successive representation, "0 imputed disqualification," 1 and the screening, or
Chinese wall, defense. 42 A close look at the development of the
31. Patterson, supra note 25, at 941.
32. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982).
33. Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 921 (1955).
34. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, EC 4-5, EC 4-6
(1980).
35. Id. Canon 5, DR 5-105.
36. Id. Canon 9.
37. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
39. In 1977, the ABA Board of Governors created the Kutak Commission to consider
revisions in the Code. After a preliminary review, the Commission assumed the task of
reformulating the Code. Armstrong, The Kutak Commission Report: Retrospect and
Prospect, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 475, 486-89 (1982). The ABA House of Delegates adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983, after "[s]ix years of debate and
often heated controversy" that "ended on a comparatively harmonious note." 52
U.S.L.W. 2077 (Aug. 9, 1983).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983): "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter ... represent another person
in the same or a substantially related matter .... "
41. Id. Rule 1.l0(b); see supra note 11.
42. Id. Rule 1.ll(b): "A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from
participation .... "
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final rules through the records of the Kutak Commission reveals
a shift away from strict imputation of disqualification. 43

B.

The Disqualification Package

The Kutak Commission shared the concerns of earlier
ethicists for confidentiality and loyalty to the client's interests. 44
The Commission began its work with a flexible approach, focusing on principles to guide the lawyer m a variety of
circumstances. 411
As the Commission articulated the standards relating to conflicts of interest involving a former client, members reiterated
the value of loyalty to the client. Commission members also
raised the competing interest involved in enabling the client to
have "the fullest choice of legal counsel reasonably possible."46
Furthermore, pragmatic concerns argued against a strict disqualification rule, particularly for the government attorney.4 7 The
government attorney, who had broad exposure to a variety of
issues and clients in a highly specialized area, and often had access to sensitive government information, faced severe limitations on his ability to shift to and work productively in the private sector. Consequently, a strict disqualification rule was a
strong disincentive to government service. 48
43. The Commission's four-year effort provided detailed records of the changes that
were made as well as the rationale and the sources for those changes. Although not the
most controversial matter to come before the Kutak Commission, vicarious disqualification was a continuing concern. The records of the Commission, including files and bound
journals, collected by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter for the Commission, are on file at
the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, Illinois.
The Commission records are collected in bound volumes and vertical files, both arranged chronologically. The bound volumes are cited herein as published works of the
Kutak Commission. Sections within those bound volumes are cited as articles. Materials
from the vertical files are cited as unpublished works [hereinafter Commission Papers].
Copies of the Kutak Commission bound volume and vertical file materials cited in this
Note are on file with the Journal of Law Reform.
44. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, at 29-33, 70, in FEB. 24-25, 1978
JOURNAL.
45. "The problems arising from these various situations cannot be resolved by a multitude of rules. They can be dealt with only in ... terms of principles which the lawyer
must apply in good faith to the particular situation." Id. at 29-30.
46. Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, Aug. 2, 1979, at 7.1-3, in JUNE 1979
JOURNAL.
47. The Commission believed that "the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association." Id.
48. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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The Commission's efforts to reconcile these issues resulted in
the development of Model Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11. The formulation of each of these rules reflects some ambivalence among
the members of the Commission. That ambivalence is, in turn,
evident in the Commission's deference to case law, its efforts to
moderate each of the standards, and its attention to the consent
provision in each standard.
1. Conff,ict of interest: the "substantially related" standard- The Commission's first draft of Model Rule 1.9-"Conflict of Interest: Former Client"-established the general outline
of the rule but differed markedly from the final version. 49 A key
omission was the established standard for the relationship between the subject matter of the former and the present representation-that they be substantially related. 50
Fundamental to the law of conflict of interest in successive
representation and vicarious disqualification cases is the substantial relation test established in T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures.rn Although the court declined to inquire
into the nature and extent of the actual representation, it found
49. The first draft read:
REPRESENTATION ADVERSE TO A FORMER CLIENT
(a) A LAWYER WHO HAS REPRESENTED A CLIENT IN A MATTER
SHALL NOT THEN REPRESENT ANOTHER PERSON IN THAT MATTER IF THE POSITION OF THE LATTER PERSON IS ADVERSE TO
THAT OF THE FORMER CLIENT IN ANY MATERIAL RESPECT.
(d) UPON ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE, THE DISQUALIFICATION PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (a) MAY BE WAIVED BY THE FORMER CLIENT ....
Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, at 1-37, in OCT. 1978 JOURNAL.
The discussion in this Note is limited to those changes related to the nature of the
lawyer's conflict of interest. Additional sections of the first draft considered the arbitrator and the judge; a discussion of these roles is beyond the scope of this Note.
50. Memorandum re: Draft Rules of Professional Conduct dated 1/25/79 from
Thomas Morgan to ABA Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards at 4, reprinted
in Kutak Comm'n, FEB. 1979 JOURNAL (referring to draft rule 1.11 and citing T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), for its holding that
the matters must be substantially related); ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Business
Law, Comments of Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability on December
1979 Draft, reprinted in Kutak Comm'n, FEB. 1979 JOURNAL (stating that, as drafted, the
rule was less restrictive of lawyers than the then-existing rule prohibiting representation
in matters substantially related).
51. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court stressed the lawyer's duty of absolute loyalty to the clients' interests and the duty to maintain the confidences of a client,
thus encouraging clients to make known all the facts related to their case. Id. at 268-69;
see also Note, supra note 7, at 681; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1318
(describing the test as a prophylactic one). Another concern was the indirect violation of
confidences-that the court's inquiry into the lawyer's knowledge not reveal the confidences that are being protected. Note, supra note 7, at 682.
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the matters to be substantially related where one could reasonably conclude that in the former representation the attorney
might have acquired information regarding the subject of the
subsequent representation. 112
The Second and the Seventh Circuits have provided the most
detailed analyses of the substantial relationship standard. 113
Other courts have applied the tests expounded by these two circuits and have, somewhat reluctantly, disqualified law firms. 11"
Courts have taken two complementary approaches to the standard delineated by the Second Circuit. 1111 The first test of substantial relation,6 6 which builds upon T.C. Theatre, requires that
the relationship between the prior and present representation
not only be patently clear, but also be identical or essentially the
same. 117 More recently, a federal district court held that a finding
of substantial relation requires "virtual congruence" of issues. 118
The second approach asks whether an attorney is "at least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning
the other side through prior representation" and whether the
representation threatens to taint the trial. 119 Although the Sec52. 113 F. Supp. at 269. Some courts have interpreted the substantial relationship
test to require an irrebuttable presumption that the individual attorney has acquired
privileged information and must be disqualified, assuming that a substantial relationship
exists. E.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo.
1985). Other courts have found the presumption rebuttable. E.Z. Paintr Corp. v. Padco,
Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417,418,420
(7th Cir. 1983); Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 286 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
53. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir.
1980); Haagen-Dazs, 639 F. Supp. at 285-86. But see Whatcott v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1032,
1035 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the imputation of knowledge to the firm in a second
round of litigation aimed at disqualifying opposing counsel). For a related case, see
Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
55. Sorting out the positions remains a challenge because of the Supreme Court's
rulings on interlocutory appeal. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1981),
overruled Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975), but the decision in Armstrong was vacated on the interlocutory appeal issues, 449
U.S. 1106 (1981). See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
56. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756. The panel considered upon whom the standard
was to be imposed, distinguishing those who were heavily involved in the first attorneyclient situation from those who "enter briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific
purpose relating solely to legal questions." Id.
57. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978).
58. USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The law firm had represented the USFL in a series of early, organizing inquiries. In the earlier representation,
the firm had avoided a conflict of interest due to simultaneous representation-the firm
also represented the NFL commissioner-by obtaining the consent of both parties.
59. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ond Circuit has subsequently reaffirmed this approach, it noted
that the appearance of impropriety alone is an insufficient basis
for disqualification. 80
The Seventh Circuit has outlined a three-step approach and
has more consistently found a rebuttable presumption of imputed knowledge at every level of communication-client to attorney, attorney to former and to present firm-than have the
other circuits. 81 The first step asks whether there is a substantial
relationship between the prior and present representation. 82 The
court will then determine whether the presumption of shared
confidences and the imputation of knowledge to other members
of the prior firm have been rebutted. Finally, the court looks at
the present representation; if the presumption of shared confidences is not rebutted, disqualification would follow. 83 Recent
decisions not only make clear that the presumption may be rebutted, but also endorse the concept of the Chinese wall as one
way to rebut the presumption-with "objective and verifiable
evidence presented to the trial court and ... made on a case-bycase basis. " 84
The decisions-particularly the approach of the Second Circuit-may pose an alternative to the Chinese wall defense and,
accordingly, a way for the courts to avoid the abrupt change in
policy represented by the Chinese wall. Such an approach would
emphasize the circumstances of the representation. Judicial inquiry into the efficacy of a particular Chinese wall, on the other
hand, would emphasize and perhaps create incentives for protection of client confidences. 811
Despite some new approaches to conflicts-of-interest analyses,
the substantial relationship test has remained a basic element of
the analysis. The Kutak Commission recognized the error in its
60. Id. at 1247. District court panels in the Second Circuit have expanded upon this
view. See USFL, 605 F. Supp. at 1465-68; Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 30
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
61. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'! Bank v.
County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium
A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 190-92 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223-25 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Talley, Toward Chinese Walls: The Seventh Circuit Debates Rebuttable Presumptions in Vicarious Disqualification Cases, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 59 (1986).
62. The standard is not as strict as the one that the Second Circuit has imposed
because it does not require either the virtual congruence of issues or the tainting of the
trial.
63. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 420.
64. Id. at 421.
65. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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omission and, in its next draft, restored the substantial relationship test. 66
2. Confiict of interest: balancing interests and obtaining
consent- The other changes that the Commission made in redrafting Model Rule 1.9 indicated a desire to balance the interests of attorneys and clients. The final rule assured that the client would be well-informed about potential conflicts of interest;
the attorney who informed his client and obtained consent
would be able to enter into or continue a new representation.
The Commission revised the draft rule entitled "Conflict of
Interest: Former Client" to prohibit using, to the disadvantage
of the former client, information that was acquired in the course
of the previous representation. 67 Subsequent changes in this provision balanced the interests of attorneys and clients. The January 1979 draft excluded from the prohibition information that
has become the subject of general knowledge. 68 The final rule
shifted the scope of the protected information from that "acquired in service to the client" to that "relating to the
representation. " 69
Clause (a) of draft rule 1.9 contained a consent provision, permitting an exception to disqualification where "the former client
consents after consultation." 70 The members of the Commission
considered several standards for disclosure as a condition of consent. The first-"adequate disclosure" 71 -was a distinct contrast
to the "full disclosure" standard contained in a related provision
of the Code. 72 Subsequently, the drafters cast the exception in
66. Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Jan. 1979, at 1.11-1, in DEc. 1978 JOURNAL.
The Commission clearly deferred to case law in writing this standard. The reporter
noted that the Commission questioned whether the standard of Rule 1.l0(a) (final Rule
1.9(a)) was "adequately restrictive," but found it sufficient that "the substantial relationship test set forth in this Rule was a direct derivative of case pronouncements on the
issue." Kutak Comm'n, OcT. 1980 JOURNAL 22.
67. This prohibition had appeared in the first working paper. Compare Kutak
Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, supra note 49, at 1-37 with Kutak Comm'n,
Working Papers, Jan. 1979, supra note 66, at 1.11-1.
68. This change, preserved in the final rule and reversing, in part, Canon 37, relaxed
the absolute inviolability of the client's confidences. For a critique of the change, see
Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J.
1074, 1079 (1980).
69. Compare Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Jan. 1979, supra note 66, at 1.11-1
("information acquired in service to the client") with Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 DiscusSION DRAM' 44 ("information gained in or relating to representation") and MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1983).
70. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1983).
71. Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 DISCUSSION DRAFT 44.
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1980).
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terms of the client's consent "upon disclosure." 73 The final modifications, changing "disclosure" to "consultation,"74 and without
the modifiers "adequate" or "full," suggest greater flexibility for
the lawyer. The comment to the rule also included the client's
authority to waive disqualification. 75
3. Vicarious disqualification- In writing the Model Rules,
the Commission was at first unsure about the appropriate standard for imputation of disqualification from the individual lawyer to the firm where a conflict of interest in successive representation exists. Although the concept of vicarious disqualification was familiar in case law, 76 it appeared neither in
the 1908 Canons nor in any of the amendments. 77 The Code, as
adopted in 1969, provided in Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105 for
an imputation of disqualification "if the interests of another client may impair the independent professional judgment of the
lawyer." 78 A 1974 amendment extended the imputation to "withdrawal from employment under a Disciplinary Rule." 79
The first working paper of the Commission opposed automatic
imputation of disqualification to the firm solely because of the
disqualification of a lawyer who had a prior attorney-client relationship with an opposing party. 80 The Commission expressed
concern for the government attorney moving into private prac73. Kutak Comm'n, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, MAY 1981 Rule 1.9.
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 and Terminology (1983)
(defining "consultation" as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question").
75. See id. Rule 1.9 comment (balancing the interests of the client). But see Gillers,
supra note 24, at 245 (footnotes omitted):
The lawyers who approved the Rules looked after their own. They have given us
an astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers
over clients, other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line,
paragraph, and provision that permits significant choice. It is internally inconsistent to the bar's benefit.
76. See Note, supra note 33, at 919.
77. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances stated the concept
succinctly in 1931: "The relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and
all the members thereof, are barred from accepting any employment that any one member of the firm is prohibited from taking." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931), reprinted in 17 A.B.A. J. 469 (1931).
78. AMERICAN BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 225,
246-51 (1979) (discussing changes in DR 5-105). The rule encompassed withdrawal from
employment where the interests of another client might impair professional judgment.
79. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D). Disciplinary Rule 5105(D) (1980) (as amended Mar. 1974) of the Code thus encompassed withdrawal because of the "appearance of impropriety," and, in particular, withdrawal from private
employment where a lawyer had substantial responsibility as a public employee. Id. DR
5-105(D), Canon 9, DR 9-101(B); see Note, Confiicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1045-46 (1977).
80. Kutak Cornm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 31.
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tice and stated, "The standard is a narrow one, which does not
preclude disqualification in appropriate cases."81
Commission members ultimately decided to prohibit "knowing" representation. 82 The final rule more clearly distinguished
the firm with which a lawyer subject to disqualification becomes
associated-which "may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter"-from the firm he has
left-which "is not prohibited" from thereafter representing a
person unless the matter is substantially related or a lawyer remaining in the firm has confidential information. 83 The rule suggests, and the comment makes clear, that different standards
In 1975, the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar proposed an
absolute imputation of disqualification; the proposal encountered opposition almost immediately. See infra note 99. Late in 1977, as the debate continued in the District of
Columbia, the Kutak Commission initiated its work.
81. Id. At least one commentator asked the Commission for greater clarity in this
section and suggested that the standard proposed was a relaxation of current case law.
Memorandum from Elizabeth Bartholet to the ABA Commission on the Evaluation of
Professional Standards (Dec. 1, 1978), in Commission Papers, supra note 43.
The second draft provided a nearly complete outline of the final rule, addressing conflicting representation by lawyers associated in a firm and lawyers who leave a firm, as
well as their subsequent colleagues, but omitting reference to the former firm. Kutak
Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-1. The Commission expressed
its discomfort with vicarious disqualification of lawyers moving between firms:
When lawyers have been associated but then dissolve their association, however, the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the firm is the same as a
single lawyer no longer has realistic application .... First, the client previously
represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client
is not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly
cast as to preclude other persons from having the fullest choice of legal counsel
reasonably possible. Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably
hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after
having left a previous association.
Id. at 7.1-2 to -3; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983)
(expressing further concern regarding curtailment of opportunity). The Commission later
included the "lawyer remaining in the firm." Kutak Comm'n, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT,
MAY 1981. at 95.
The drafted rule embodied a prohibition on representation that involved a "significant
risk of disclosing confidences or making improper use of information," or "assuming significant participation or responsibility for asserting a position adverse to a client for
whom the lawyer had previously assumed significant participation or responsibility in
the same or a substantially related matter." Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft,
supra note 46, at 7.1-1.
82. Proposed Final Draft as Revised Through June 30, 1982, in Commission Papers,
supra note 43; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983) (defining "knowingly" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," but stipulating that
"knowledge may be inferred from circumstances").
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10; cf. ABA Office of Policy Admin., Results of 1983 Midyear Meeting on Amendments to the Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, in Commission Papers, supra note 43 (including in draft submitted to ABA Rule l.l0(a) as adopted, and combining the rules on termination and association with a new firm).
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should be applied to the lawyer, the former firm, and the present firm. 84
One way to avoid the imputation of disqualification is to permit the screening of a lawyer who is subject to disqualification.
Several commentators proposed the screening defense for private firms, 86 but the Commission never seriously considered the
suggestion. An early draft suggested some support by listing
" [r] elevant factors in determining the likelihood of actual access
to client confidences." 86 The comment to Model Rule 1.10 only
hints at the use of the Chinese wall as a remedy to avoid disqualification where a conflict of interest exists. 87
4. The public servant exception- From the outset, the
Commission intended to give special attention to the government attorney. 88 Shortly after beginning deliberations, members
decided to reserve a separate section for issues related to conflicts of interest of the government attorney. 89 The members recognized the public interest in protecting the confidences that a
government attorney might hold. Accordingly, the Commission
wished to avoid potential abuses of government power and, at
the same time, to protect government confidences. 90 The Commission also wanted to avoid restrictions on a successful private
career, following government employment, that would dissuade
highly qualified candidates from public service. 91
84. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983).
85. Digest of Comments on Final Draft, comment number 50 (1982), in Commission
Papers, supra note 43 (suggesting that the "Comment recognizes propriety of screening
mechanisms and they should therefore be referred to in the Rule"); id. comment number
77 (advocating a screening provision "particularly because of the large number of lawyers
employed by corporate law departments").
86. Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-5 (listing the
lawyer's professional experience, the division of responsibility, and the organizational
structure of the firm).
87. Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Frances W. Hamermesh (Nov. 18, 1985)
(describing the reference to the Chinese wall in the comments to rule 1.10 as "elliptical")
(copy on file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.).
88. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 70.
89. Originally, the term "persons," as used in Rule 1.9, for example, was to encompass the government agency. Kutak Comm'n, Working Papers, Dec. 15, 1978, supra note
49, at 1-37. The Commission reorganized its draft documents to pull together issues related to the government attorney. Memorandum from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Administrative Law Section Ad Hoc Committee on Rule 1.11 (Apr. 21, 1983), in Commission
Papers, supra note 43.
90. "The risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used
for the special benefit of a private client." Kutak Comm'n, Discussion Draft, Jan. 1980,
at 41, in OcT. 1979 JOURNAL.
91. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. CL 1977) (describing the
risk that the former government attorney could take on the status of a "Typhoid
Mary"); Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976); Cutler,
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To balance the strong public policy favoring the removal of
disincentives to government service 92 and concerns about the
misuse of government authority, 93 the Commission adopted a vicarious disqualification rule with an exception for screening:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless
the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that [former
government] lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless ..
. the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom ....
(b) ... A firm with which that lawyer is associated may
undertake or continue representation in the matter only
if the disqualified lawyer is screened .... 94
Thus, the screening provision in the Model Rules is an exception
created to ameliorate the harsh effects of imputed disqualification for the attorney who leaves or enters 96 government service.
A 1975 opinion of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, which cautioned against imposing too strict a
standard of disqualification on former government lawyers, was
the source of the screening provision. 96 Again, the concerns were
limitations on the individual's employment options and the
availability of able lawyers for government service. 97 In 1969, the
ABA had adopted the Code with a narrow vicarious disqualificaNew Rule Goes Too Far, 63 A.BA J. 725 (1977). But see Freedman, For a New Rule, 63
A.BA J. 724 (1977).
92. See Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.ll comment (1983).
94. Id. Rule l.ll(a)-(b).
95. Id. Rule l.ll(c).
96.
There are, however, weighty policy considerations in support of the view that a
special disciplinary rule relating only to former government lawyers should not
broadly limit the lawyer's employment after he leaves government service ....
[T]he ability of government to recruit young professionals and competent lawyers should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future
practice nor should too great a sacrifice be demanded of the lawyers willing to
enter government service ....
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 518 (footnotes omitted).
97. Id.
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tion standard in DR 5-105. 98 There was no mention of a screening defense. A 1974 amendment to DR 5-105 extended the disqualification, and a strong response to the implications of this
amendment provided the impetus for ABA Formal Opinion 342,
which acknowledged circumstances under which screening was
desirable as a defense against disqualification. 99
From 1978 until completion of the final draft of the Model
Rules, the Commission struggled with the issue of separate
treatment for the government attorney. 100 The September 1980
draft introduced a specific screening provision. The expanded
98. See ANNOTATEu...C.onE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 78, at 246-51
(annotating DR 5-105).
99. The opinion acknowledges two circumstances where screening would be
necessary:
[1] [W]e construe D.R. 5-105(D) to be inapplicable to other government lawyers
associated with a particular government lawyer who is himself disqualified ....
Although vicarious disqualification of a government department is not necessary
or wise, the individual lawyer should be screened from any direct or indirect
participation in the matter .... [2] So long as the individual [former government] lawyer is held to be disqualified and is screened from any direct or indirect participation in the matter, the problem of his switching sides is not present
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 521.
The debate over vicarious disqualification had special interest for the District of Columbia Bar Association. As the result of an inquiry to, and an opinion from, its Legal
Ethics Committee, the D.C. bar undertook consideration of the matter at great length.
Memorandum for the Board of Governors from William H. Allen, Chairman, Legal Ethics Committee, District of Columbia Bar (July 3, 1978), in Commission Papers, supra
note 43. Compare Freedman, supra note 91 (arguing against the use of a screeningwaiver provision to cure disqualification) with Cutler, supra note 91 (supporting screening for the government attorney).
In 1982, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals resolved the issue with its "Revolving Door" order stating that the imputation of disqualification would not apply if the
lawyer, disqualified from a matter "in which he participated personally and substantially
as a public officer or employee," is "screened from any form of participation in the matter or representation as the case may be, and from sharing in any fees resulting therefrom." ("Revolving Door"), 445 A.2d 615, 617 (D.C. 1982) (per curiam) (adopting a
screening and notification provision, and rejecting a requirement of waiver and the submission of affidavits).
See also Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1977); Fordham, There
Are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients in Litigation Which Are Not
Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1194-95 (1978);
Note, supra note 79, at 1045-46.
The Kutak Commission recognized that the new section on the government lawyer
"[has] roots ... in the District of Columbia Bar's proposal and expressions of concerns of
the Justice Department related thereto.... [T]he Commission's rule ... must contemplate broad nat'l application to lawyers situated in state and local governments." Kutak
Comm'n, Journal, Dec. 14-16, 1979, at 17, in DEc. 1979 JOURNAL.
100. Kutak Comm'n, Preliminary Working Draft, supra note 44, at 70 (discussing
the obligation to maintain confidences); Kutak Comm'n, Unofficial Precirculation Draft,
at 77, in TENTATIVE DRAFT #3, SEPT. 1979 (penciled-in comment noting: "take out government-deal separately").
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comment to the provision indicated that the Commission's major concern was not to create disincentives to government service. 101 The historical development of the screening provision
and the language of the rule, supported by the records of the
Kutak Commission, demonstrate the intent to permit screening
as an exception to vicarious disqualification exclusively for the
government attorney. 102

II.

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WALL

Despite the rather strict provisions favoring vicarious disqualification that existed in the ethical standards, the bar has consistently exerted pressure for the Chinese wall defense. Judicial
decisions suggest several ways in which courts have responded to
this pressure against disqualification, short of ruling on the Chinese wall itself. This Part focuses briefly on the efforts of the
courts and then on the standards suggested for the Chinese wall
defense.
A.

A Shifting Standard

Courts have continued to apply the substantial relationship
test and to examine presumptions of shared confidences in prior
and present representations. In recent years, the courts have
considered the appealability of motions for disqualification.
1. Imputing shared confidences- In reviewing conflicts of
interest related to successive representation, courts have found
that the lawyer-client relationship creates a presumption-most
often an irrebuttable presumption-of shared confidences. 103
The presumption exists to protect and encourage client confidences. When a lawyer shifts to another firm that becomes involved in the same matter, there is the risk of violating a client's
confidences. Considering the implications of such mobility,
101. "The provisions on screening ... and waiver ... are necessary to prevent the
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering pu\)lic service." Kutak Comm'n, SEPT. 1980 D,scussION DRAFT 48.
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.ll(a)(l), (b) (1983); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
103. Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Peterson,
Commentary, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh
Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 399 (1984).
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courts have differed in their willingness to impute that shared
confidence to the firm that he has left or to his new firm. 104
Where they have presumed a sharing of confidences, courts have
split on whether such a presumption is rebuttable. 1011 Nevertheless, courts seem increasingly willing to find these presumptions
rebuttable. 106
2. Interlocutory appeal- Although the Supreme Court has
never considered, on the merits, a case on disqualification of
counsel for conflict of interest, the Court has, in recent years,
addressed the appealability of disqualification questions. 107 In
its most recent case, 108 the Court refused to find that the risk of
delay, the vindication of an attorney's reputation, or the use of a
disqualification motion to harass an attorney were sufficient justifications for interlocutory appeal. 109 With the rejection of an
interlocutory appeal for disqualification motions in civil actions,
a clear or predictable standard for disqualification becomes more
important.

B.

The Chinese Wall

After a court acknowledges that the presumption of shared or
imputed sharing of confidences is rebuttable, the attorney or
firm defending against disqualification must demonstrate the ef104. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 comment (1983); see also
Note, supra note 7, at 682.
105. Note, supra note 7, at 682 & n.24; see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
106. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 418 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'! Bank
v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium
A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Liebman,
The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw.
U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Peterson, supra note 103; Talley, supra note 61; Note, Towards a
More Balanced Balancing: A Chronological Approach to Attorney Disqualification for
Prior Representation, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 219; Note, supra note 7. But see Hallmark
Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc, 616 F. Supp. 516, 519 & n.l (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(describing the presumption as "irrefutable").
107. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) (holding that
orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases are not subject to immediate appeal); Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (granting of pretrial motion to disqualify counsel in
a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that there is no interlocutory appeal of a denial of a pretrial
motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981); Note, Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller: The Final Decision on the Immediate
Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Disqualifying Counsel, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 613.
108. Richardson-Merrell, 105 S. Ct. 2757.
109. Id. at 2765-66.

FALL

1986]

Reevaluation of the Chinese Wall

265

fective construction of a Chinese wall. Although several of the
federal circuits have endorsed the concept of a Chinese wall, 110
few have accepted a particular design. They appear reluctant to
accept any wall as a sufficient guarantee against a conflict of interest. At the same time, however, in cases involving former government attorneys, the courts have begun to evaluate the standards of construction for a proper Chinese wall. These cases,
which have found or described a wall that is sufficient to isolate
the contaminating former government attorney, suggest the essential elements of any Chinese wall. 111 The primary considerations are isolation of attorney-client communications-past and
future, verbal and written-the firm's experience and organizational structure, the system of rewards within the firm, and the
size of the firm. 112
Court decisions have suggested that adequate protections
would consider the size of the law firm, the area of specialization
of the attorney, and the attorney's position in the firm. 113
Screening measures focusing on the individual attorney would
guarantee that the attorney (1) was excluded from participation
in the action, (2) had no access to relevant files, (3) derived no
remuneration from the funds gained in prosecuting the action,
(4) was not allowed to view documents related to the litigation,
and (5) was not permitted to listen in on others' discussions of
the matter. 11 '
ll0. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, has affirmed the concept of the wall but has
adopted a case-by-case approach to analysis of the conflict of interest and the remedy.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
lll. Note, supra note 7, at 712-15; see also Note, supra note 106, at 241. Standards
may also be gleaned from opinions of the ABA and from federal statutes and regulations.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982); 31 C.F.R. § 10.26 (1986) (Treasury); 17 C.F.R.
§ 200.735-8 (1986) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 46 C.F.R. § 502.32 (1986)
(Federal Maritime Commission).
ll2. Considerations include: (1) discussions between firm members and the screened
lawyer regarding the former representation that are relevant to the new matter, (2) usual
patterns of communication within the firm, (3) the firm's competence in the area involved without the screened attorney or before he joined the firm, (4) communication
within the firm regarding potential conflicts, and (5) elimination of any pecuniary interest of the screened attorney. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 889, 31
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 552, 570-71 (1976), reprinted in ABA, Disciplinary Workshop, June
9-ll, 1977, Boston, Mass. (Tab 5). Courts at all levels have considered the requirements
for the Chinese wall. See Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (W.D.
Tenn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 798 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1986); Weglarz v. Bruck, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 5, 470 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1984); see also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442
(2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 449 U.S. ll06 (1981).
ll3. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982);
see also Manning, 619 F. Supp. at 1329; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at
1367.
ll4. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 442.
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The Court of Claims considered the efficacy of screening measures and upheld screening practices in two cases as sufficient to
defeat a motion for disqualification. 1111 In Sierra Vista Hospital
v. United States, 116 the court acceded to protections against access to files, prohibitions on consultation with the disqualified
attorney, and physical separation from files, including eventual
transfer of the case to a different office of the firm. 117 In Kesselhaut v. United States, 118 the court was not willing to disqualify where the firm acted promptly, and the individual attorney
refrained from offering advice or information, never looked at
the files involved, and received a straight salary with no share of
the profits. 119
Assessing the efficacy of the Chinese wall thus requires an
evaluation of the firm's ability to isolate the individual attorney
and to identify matters of potential conflict. 120 To date, some
courts have been willing to accept criteria such as those suggested in Sierra Vista and Kesselhaut. These cases, however,
have involved former government employees. The underlying
policy is that the court will not disqualify the firm if visible and
effective measures are in place to avert a conflict.
Whether the courts would apply the same standards when a
firm attempts to screen a private attorney, rather than a former
government attorney, is uncertain. The Seventh Circuit has
come the closest to approving such an application, suggesting
that "the presumption of shared confidences could be rebutted
by demonstrating that 'specific institutional mechanisms,' (e.g.
'Chinese Walls,') had been implemented." 121 Nevertheless, that
court has not as yet upheld any institutional mechanisms that it
has examined. The Chinese wall remains unavailable as a defense to the private attorney.

Ill.

WITHSTANDING PRESSURE FOR A CHANGE IN THE STANDARD

Conflict of interest in successive representation has traditionally been an ethical concern of the legal profession, and the pro115. Sierra Vista Hosp. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Kesselhaut v.
United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
116. 639 F.2d 749.
117. Id. at 751-52.
118. 555 F.2d 791.
119. Id. at 792-93.
120. For an extensive discussion of the factors in each category and a suggested form
for screening, see O'Dea, supra note 8.
121. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983).
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fession has accepted the imputation of disqualification to the
firm where an individual attorney would be disqualified. Permitting a Chinese wall defense on a motion for disqualification
would mean abolishing or relaxing the imputation of disqualification. As more firms put Chinese walls into place to protect clients and prevent conflicts of interest, such security devices
should be increasingly effective in enabling firms to acquire consent and avoid disqualification. The Chinese wall exists to protect the former client's confidences. When a party, in good faith,
believes that protection is inadequate, he withholds consent; if
necessary, he moves to disqualify his adversary's counsel. Permitting his opponent to use the Chinese wall defense would impair the client's or former client's right to consent-an important element in the attorney-client relationship.
At present, the Chinese wall is not an adequate defense to a
formal motion to disqualify a firm. At least three factors justify
denying the defense. First, the legal profession has not yet fully
considered the implications-in terms of either ethical standards
or litigation strategies-of permitting the Chinese wall defense.
Second, no one has evaluated the efficacy of particular methods
of isolation. Finally, neither lawyers nor academicians have debated the pragmatic advantages of professional flexibility and
mobility against the absolute protection due a client's confidences. This Part analyzes the lack of progress in these dimensions-consensus, empirical evidence, and policy-in explaining
why no change in the standard is warranted at the present time.

A. Lack of Fuil and Open Discussion
While developing a vicarious disqualification rule, the legal
profession has had little open discussion of the Chinese wall defense to a motion for disqualification. Analysis of the drafting of
the Model Rules demonstrates that the bar has not yet adequately considered the implications of a relaxation of vicarious
disqualification. 122 The state-by-state consideration and adoption of the rules provides some indication of support for the rule
of vicarious disqualification but says nothing about support for
the Chinese wall defense. 128 Lastly, no empirical evidence is
122. See Kutak Comm'n, First Precirculation Draft, supra note 46, at 7.1-2 to -5, for
a discussion of the dilemmas in dealing with vicarious disqualification. Much of this discussion was incorporated into the comment to Rule 1. 10.
123. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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available to demonstrate the efficacy of a wall in the context of
today's large law firms. 12•
1. Failure to consider the private attorney- The Kutak
Commission members understood the rationale for the vicarious
disqualification rule and arguments for and against the Chinese
wall defense. They limited their discussions to the desirability of
an exception for the government attorney 1211 and did not examine whether to permit the Chinese wall defense for the private attorney. The implications of the defense for the private
attorney differ significantly from those related to the government attorney's use of the defense. 126 The fact that the Commission developed a limited Chinese wall defense for the former
government attorney does not justify extension of the defense to
the private attorney. More discussion is required before allowing
the private attorney to take refuge in the defense.
The record of the Kutak Commission from 1979 through 1983
shows a gradual evolution from a strict to a somewhat more relaxed standard of vicarious disqualification. The Commission incorporated the imputation of disqualification into its draft,
made separate provision for the imputation of disqualification to
the former government attorney, and then recognized screening
to soften the harsh effects of the rule. 127 The Commission's
records, including responses to their drafts, reveal that pressure
for relaxation of the standard came from those most concerned
with the problems of the public servant, 128 not from a general
124. See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
126. In May 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti "vigorously" opposed a
sweeping vicarious disqualification rule. He stressed the government's need to attract
experienced and well-qualified people for positions of responsibility as well as capable
young attorneys:
This movement into and out of government is not accidental. It is the result of
a deliberate policy choice by the Congress and responsible Executive Branch officials-a policy choice reflected and affirmed in the determinations made by the
Congress and the Executive Branch regarding the conflict of interest and ethical
restrictions that should be imposed on persons who enter and leave government
employment. Arriving at the appropriate ethical restrictions has required a careful balancing of the need to protect the integrity of government processes and
the competing need to preserve the government's ability to attract and utilize
the services of highly qualified lawyers.
Civiletti, Commencement Ceremony, Tulane Univ. School of Law (May 10, 1980), in
Commission Papers, supra note 43; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at
1439-40.
127. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
128. The Commission Papers, supra note 43, contain correspondence between the
Commission-in particular its Chairman, Robert Kutak, and Recorder, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.-and members of the Administrative Law and the Public Utility Law Sections of
the ABA, dated from June 22, 1982 through May 18, 1983.
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clamoring of private attorneys. Those interested in the issue
controlled the discussion; therefore, Commission members gave
little consideration to applying the exception to the private
attorney. 129
Commission members did not systematically review reasonable exceptions to vicarious disqualification. Rather, they considered the narrow question of whether, for policy reasons, there
should be this single exception. They did not discuss the sufficiency of screening.
2. State adoption of the Model Rules- The process of state
adoption of the ABA Model Rules is a critical measure of the
acceptability of any of its provisions. 130 Since the ABA adoption
in 1983, over half of the states have assigned committees on ethics the task of reviewing the rules and making recommendations
for revision of state professional responsibility codes. A survey of
the actions to date suggests that the states have found the rules
on conflict of interest in successive representation, vicarious disqualification, and the screening exception for the government
employee palatable. 131 Thus far, twenty states and the United
States Claims Court132 have adopted the Model Rules. Although
almost all have amended the rules, only New Jersey and New
Hampshire have amended Rules 1.9, 1.10, or 1.11; New Hampshire made minor changes. 133 New Jersey, the first state to adopt
129. Responses to Discussion Draft of Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1980),
comments of Andrew Kaufman (1-32) (suggesting a detailed screening rule without consent), Thomas Morgan (1-43) (urging separate consideration for the private and government attorneys), and Michael N. Sohn (1-60) and Fritz R. Kahn (1-30) (both endorsing
the solution of Formal Opinion 342), in Commission Papers; supra note 43. But see
Kutak Comm'n, Public Hearings, comments of Richard Levine, DEC. 1979 JoURNAL (suggesting the same criteria should apply to disqualification of both private and government
attorneys).
130. The Supreme Court has endorsed the role of the states in determining, at least
in criminal proceedings, the ethical standards that will govern. Nix v. Whiteside, 106
S. Ct. 988, 1006 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
131. [l & 2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) passim.
132. The Claims Court was the first to adopt the Model Rules, [l Current Reports]
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 240 (May 30, 1984); the 20 states are: New
Jersey, id. at 334 (July 25, 1984); Arizona, id. at 445 (Oct. 3, 1984); Montana, id. at 855
(July 10, 1985); Minnesota, id. at 882 (July 24, 1985); Missouri, id. at 924 (Aug. 21, 1985);
Delaware, id. at 961 (Sept. 18, 1985); Washington, id. at 962 (Sept. 18, 1985); North
Carolina, id. at 1026 (Oct. 30, 1985); Arkansas, id. at 1126 (Jan. 8, 1986); New Hampshire, id. at 1142 (Jan. 22, 1986); Nevada, [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 14 (Feb. 5, 1986); Maryland, id. at 142 (Apr. 30, 1986); New Mexico,
id. at 245 (July 9, 1986); Florida, id. at 261 (July 23, 1986); Connecticut, id. at 261 (July
23, 1986); Idaho, id. at 401 (Oct. 29, 1986); Indiana, id. at 494 (Jan. 7, 1987); Wyoming,
id. at 510 (Jan. 21, 1987); Louisiana, [3 Current Reports) Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 13 (Feb. 4, 1987); and Mississippi, id. at 53 (Mar. 4, 1987).
133. See [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 14 (Feb. 5,
1986).
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the Model Rules, strengthened the protection for clients and
adopted more restrictive provisions in these three rules. 13"
At least sixteen other states have considered or are considering new codes of ethics. New York, 1311 Oregon, 138 and Illinois137
rejected revision along the liries of the Model Rules, although
Illinois did, and Oregon may, adopt some of the revisions of the
Kutak Commission, including the provisions on conflict of interest. At least one state is considering suggested amendments to
Rule 1.11. 138 Although moving slowly, the states have accepted
the concept of screening for the government employee but have
not extended it to the private lawyer.
Both state and national bar associations have considered a vicarious disqualification standard. No bar has sanctioned screening other than in the narrow context of the government employee. Ratification records of the Model Rules reveal little or
no particular attention given to the use of internal protection
devices-Chinese walls-as a defense against disqualification of
the private attorney.
B.

Lack of Empirical Support

Despite Formal Opinion 342 and experience under the Code,
no objective evaluation of the effectiveness of the Chinese wall
exists. Courts have relied on affidavits but have not seen evidence of how well modern, computerized screening works in the
large firm. 139 Most firms have established some mechanisms for
screening clients and attorneys to avoid a variety of potential
conflicts of interest. 140 Some would argue that current screening
methods provide adequate safeguards; the legal profession need
not fear such breaches of confidentiality. 141 The many court de134. (1 Current Reports) Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 17 (Jan. 25,
1984); id. at 334 (July 25, 1984).
135. Id. at 1047 (Nov. 13, 1985).
136. Id. at 1048 (Nov. 13, 1985).
137. Id. at 881-82 (July 24, 1985).
138. Utah, id. at 881 (July 24, 1985).
139. See Note, supra note 79, at 1047: "Yet, the effectiveness of screening is questionable. For example, attorneys can ignore or circumvent the segregation of the disqualified attorney from the firm's earnings and the prohibition on contacts with other attorneys." Cf. Note, supra note 7, at 705 (analyzing the Chinese wall in financial institutions
and finding it secure).
140. See Huffman, Conflicts, Disqualifications Cause Persistent Headaches, Legal
Times, May 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in Commission Papers, supra note 43. In one
survey, 98'';, of the 50 responding law firms had some screening procedures in place.
141. Id.
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cisions that find inadequacies in those walls, however, suggest
that, at a minimum, the courts need more information about the
security of such a wall before permitting a relaxation of the imputation of disqualification. 142
Many questions relating to conflicts of interest in successive
representation and vicarious disqualification remain unanswered. Most firms today have adopted screening procedures to
prevent conflicts, and screening works to the extent that former
clients do, in fact, waive the disqualification. Presumably, if consent is denied, the attorney disqualifies himself. Unanswered
questions for empirical observation and study include: What
screening procedures are in place? 143 What distinguishes those
cases where consent is granted from those where consent is denied ?144 Are existing differences related to the quality of the
screening, the degree of the substantial relationship, or the role
of the individual attorney? 1411 Where a conflict is not resolved by
waiver or withdrawal, and a former client brings a motion for
disqualification, did the screening process break down? To what
extent is the motion for disqualification a strategic litigation
decision? 146
Little information on the incentive effect of a Chinese wall defense is available. Because one objective of the conflict of interest rules is to protect the client's confidences, an effective standard must strengthen the firm's initial screening, encourage
attorney or firm withdrawal for apparent conflicts, and assure
disqualification where such confidences are threatened. The consent or waiver provision in the rules, the ethical obligation to
avoid conflicts of interest, and the desire to avoid disqualification provide a strong incentive for a strict initial screening of
any new client and for withdrawal where a conflict is identified.
142. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the court will move cautiously,
"[r]ecognizing that this is an area in which the relevant information is singularly within
the ken of the party defending against the motion to disqualify and in which the reputation of the bar as a whole is implicated." LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d
252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983).
143. Important questions include when the firm started using computerized systems
to prevent conflicts of interest and how extensively they are used.
144. The argument for a strict rule of disqualification is strengthened if cases in
which consent is withheld are actually those where confidences are more likely to be
revealed.
145. To understand the efficacy of screening, it is helpful to examine the weight accorded informal communications and reliance by one firm on the goodwill of others, or
the degree of cooperation that exists.
146. These last two questions are related. Before a court can determine whether
screening is valid, it must be able to recognize an actual breakdown or failure in
screening.
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Without the Chinese wall defense, this remains the best route to
avoiding disqualification.
The effect of the Chinese wall upon the use of the motion to
disqualify poses a more difficult question. Acknowledging
screening as a legitimate defense may discourage such a tactic
and encourage effective screening. Disallowing the defense, on
the other hand, may encourage attorneys to disqualify themselves where there is an apparent conflict, thus enhancing confidentiality and reducing the potential for use of the motion to
disqualify. Courts have favored the second approach, but no
study has demonstrated its effect upon confidentiality. Similarly, no one has examined the possible effects of other approaches that courts may use to avoid disqualification where
they feel that the screening has been adequate yet the rule prohibits the Chinese wall defense. 147
Several of the arguments favoring the wall defense present
empirical questions for which data is not currently available.
One argument is that vicarious disqualification threatens the
mobility of private attorneys in the same way that it threatened
the mobility of the former government attorney. The two attorneys are similar in experience and ambition. Today, the private
attorney has a specialized practice; he is as apt to desire a career
change after significant experience with one firm as is the government attorney. No study has compared the experience of the
two. Thus, important questions about mobility-such s.s
whether firms consider potential conflicts in new or lateral hires,
and whether the possibility of future motions to disqualify actually constrains attorneys-remain unanswered.
Proponents' arguments focus on the lawyer in the big firm.
After all, the big firms with large numbers of clients, particularly
clients with multiple associations, and with large numbers of
lawyers with many former clients, seem to invite inquiry. 148
Courts have been adamant in their refusal to acknowledge the
possibility of effective screening in a small firm. 149 Is such a distinction between large and small firms warranted? Data on firm
147. See supra text following note 64.
148. Thus, major firms such as Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison and Kirkland & Ellis have been involved in disqualification litigation. See USFL v. NFL, 605 F.
Supp. 1448 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.) (Kirkland & Ellis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
149. See Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Note, supra note 21,
at 1068; Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1355. The size of the firm is one
factor considered by virtually every court and commentator. See supra notes 112-18 and
accompanying text.
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size and screening practices would help courts to determine
whether firm size should be one factor in an evaluation of the
effectiveness of any particular wall and whether, and when, it
should operate to preclude the defense.
Despite the lack of empirical data, the judiciary may possess
special expertise in legal ethics to compensate for any lack of
data on the successful implementation of techniques to isolate
an attorney. The question, however, is not simply one of expertise in ethics, but whether judges have the requisite familiarity
with large law firm practice to evaluate the efficacy and desirability of the Chinese wall. 1110 A survey of the panels of three federal circuits reveals varied backgrounds but a decided lack of
large law firm experience in the post-1965 era of expansion. m
Few judges have had the opportunity to evaluate screening from
the perspective of their own employment in a large firm.

C.

Practical and Policy Arguments

In evaluating the policies underlying the Chinese wall defense,
the bar and the courts must address pragmatic and ethical considerations. Opponents of the Chinese wall defense emphasize
the ethical concerns-protecting confidentiality and avoiding
conflicts of interest. Thus, vicarious disqualification provides a
strong disincentive to conflicts of interest; the Chinese wall is an
important self-help, internal security device, not for use as a defense against disqualification.
Proponents of the Chinese wall suggest that the defense is not
inconsistent with justifications for the ethical standards regarding confidentiality. 162 If the lawyer's obligation is to protect the
confidences of the client, disqualification on the mere presumption of a violation of confidences is unnecessarily restrictive. In
addition, many would suggest that even the presumption that an
attorney has acquired confidential information by virtue of his
150. Conversation with Professor Wade McCree, Jr., Ann Arbor, Mich. (Sept. 23,
1985).
151. The criterion for large firm experience was whether the judge had practiced in a
firm of more than 40 lawyers for at least five years since 1960. In the three circuits
studied, three judges in the D.C. Circuit, three in the Second Circuit, and one in the
Seventh Circuit met the criterion (credentials are listed in 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (1985)). The probability of a randomly selected three-judge panel including no
judge with such experience ranged from .339 in the D.C. Circuit to .70 in the Seventh
Circuit. Consultation with Daniel S. Hamermesh, Professor of Economics, Mich. State
Univ., East Lansing, Mich. (Mar. 1, 1986).
152. Note, supra note 7, at 715.
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membership in the firm is rebuttable, particularly in this era of
large firms. m The prevalence of arguments for the Chinese wall
and persistent litigation suggest pressure to revise the standard.
Proponents' arguments, however, lack support and retain more
than a hint of self-interest.
1. The realities of legal practice- Courts have demonstrated a reluctance to disqualify, and a willingness to accept the
Chinese wall concept, where they believe that the motion for
disqualification is being used as a delaying tactic in litigation. uH
Proposed standards for the Chinese wall suggest some sympathy
for the realities of today's legal practice; although large firms
suggest that any one lawyer may be far removed from another
matter handled by the firm, the trend toward larger firms increases the potential for conflicts of interest. 155 Attorney mobility and misuse of the disqualification motion remain the strongest arguments supporting the Chinese wall defense. 156
Arguments in favor of the Chinese wall have stressed its pragmatic virtues. Even the possibility of vicarious disqualification
threatens many of the basic characteristics of large-scale legal
practice. 157 These characteristics include interfirm mobility, consultation, farming out of corporate work, and specialization. 158
153. Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1330, 1355.
154.
[T)he rule serves no worthwhile public interest if it becomes a mere tool enabling a litigant to improve his prospects by depriving his opponent of competent
counsel; and the rule should not be permitted to interfere needlessly with the
right of litigants to obtain competent counsel of their choosing, particularly in
specialized areas requiring special technical training and experience.
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 3, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. at 518-19 (footnotes omitted); see also Kaufman, Conflict Problems: Introduction, 33 Bus. LAW. 1191 (1978);
O'Dea, supra note 8, at 694.
155. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text; see also USFL v. NFL, 605
F. Supp. 1448, 1467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156. Few courts have, as yet, handed down opinions under the new Model Rules.
Some decisions, however, have considered the standard set forth in the Model Rules
even where the state has not as yet adopted them. One Arizona opinion examined the
problem of mobility as addressed in the comment to Rule 1.10, pointing to the expressed
concern that the rules
not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on
new clients after having left a previous association. The comments also acknowledge that if imputed disqualification "were defined with unqualified rigor" there
would be a radical curtailment of the opportunity for lawyers to move from one
practice setting to another . . . .
Galleher v. Horton, 148 Ariz. 537, 547, 715 P.2d 1225, 1235 (Ct. App. 1985); see also
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1366.
157. Huffman, supra note 140; see also Note, supra note 111, at 220-21, 232.
158.
One factor that will often be relevant in determining whether screening will
significantly increase attorney mobility is the degree to which the attorney and
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Furthermore, the increased use of the motion for disqualification
as a tool in litigation threatens added delay and costs to an already overburdened legal system. 1119
Preservation of the client's right to choice of counsel has been
the other major argument put forward by proponents of the Chinese wall as a defense to disqualification. 160 The Seventh Circuit
has referred to the delicate balance between "the sacrosanct privacy of the attorney-client relationship (and the professional integrity implicated by that relationship) and the prerogative of a
party to proceed with counsel of its choice." 161 The Second Circuit has also suggested that the client's right to choose counsel
freely requires courts to impose a high standard of proof on the
side seeking to disqualify opposing counsel. 162 Limiting the use
of disqualification as a sanction for a conflict of interest violation preserves the client's right to his choice of attorney. 163
Critics of the Chinese wall have challenged the ability of law
firms to regulate themselves. 164 Allowing firms to build a wall
may create a false sense of security for the public. First, as the
wall becomes institutionalized, an adversary claiming a breach
or potential breach of confidences will have more difficulty gathering evidence to prove that the wall is ineffective. At present,
the threshold test is proof that the matters at issue in the curhis potential firm engage in a specialized practice with a relatively restricted
clientele.... It is one thing to bar an attorney who has developed such a specialty from opposing former clients in matters substantially related to ones in
which he has represented them; this may reduce his marketability to some degree, but it will not necessarily preclude his becoming affiliated with lawyers engaged in a similar practice. It is quite another thing, however, to extend the
attorney's disability to all attorneys in any firm he joins; such a rule may increase the security of former clients, but it devastates the attorney's future employment prospects. In such situations, permitting Chinese wall rebuttal of the
presumption of shared knowledge can save the attorney from becoming a professional pariah.
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1366.
159. Greene, Everybody's Doing It-But Who Should Be? Standing to Make a Disqualification Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests
Adverse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205, 229 (1983); O'Dea,
supra note 8, at 693-94.
160. Greene, supra note 159, at 206.
161. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983).
162. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978).
163. Commentators have stressed their concern about overriding this right where
courts have disqualified an attorney or firm. See Note, Attorney Disqualification: The
Case for an Irrebuttable Presumption Rebutted, 44 ALB. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1980);
Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to That of
Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, supra note 21, at 1067.
164. Victor, Firms Facing More Ethical Challenges, Nat'! L.J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 1, col.
4.
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rent and former representation are substantially related. 1611
Where the presumption of imputed confidences is rebuttable,
the burden will shift to the present firm to prove that they have
constructed an effective wall or that confidences have not been
violated. To refute such testimony is an imposing task for the
party seeking disqualification.
2. Other arguments- Most discussion of vicarious disqualification has focused on the desirability of modifying or relaxing
the strict rule. Some commentators have suggested that the easiest way to resolve the uncertainty regarding the standard is to
maintain an absolute rule of disqualification, 166 excluding even
the government employee exception. 167 Such an approach, they
argue, is the best way to safeguard confidentiality, assuming that
is the goal. Anything less poses the temptation of circumventing
the rule and introduces an appearance of impropriety.
But there are also risks in such an absolute standard. First, it
encourages the tactical use of the motion to disqualify. Firms
need screening systems 168 and will implement them. The absolute standard, however, provides no additional incentive for
firms to try to build as secure a system as possible. Given the
strength of sentiment favoring some discretion in vicarious disqualification, courts should seek alternative theories for avoiding
disqualification, such as the "taint to the trial" rule. 169
CONCLUSION

The spectre of large law firms, increased specialization, and
mobility at the associate level suggest the need for protection
165. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
166. Telephone interview with Prof. Monroe Freedman, Hofstra Univ. School of Law
(Nov. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Freedman interview]. The proposed standards of the American Trial Lawyer's Association permit successive representation only with the client's
knowing and voluntary consent. The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation,
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 1.2 (revised draft, May 1982). But see
Comment, Disqualification of Counsel: Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 215 (1981) (footnote omitted): "Chinese walls, therefore, should be
permitted in adverse interest disqualifications not only because they prevent the substantive impropriety of misuse of confidential information, but also because their very
preclusion lends to these situations a greater appearance of impropriety than they objectively should entail."
167. Professor Freedman argues that the government context provides a good example of the risk of conflict. How unlikely is it that anyone currently serving on a government commission, but soon to be out in the private sector, will reject his former colleague's request for consent? Freedman interview, supra note 166.
168. O'Dea, supra note 8, at 718.
169. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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against conflicts of interest in successive representation. Firms
are successfully utilizing computerized systems to screen for and
avoid potential conflicts. That success has increased the confidence of firms in their own systems to the point where they are
eager to argue that such screening, or the well-constructed Chinese wall, should be a defense against a motion for disqualification. But the limited nature of discussions within the profession
and the lack of evaluation of the effectiveness of Chinese walls
caution against permitting private attorneys to use this potent
defense against vicarious disqualification of firms.
Proponents of the Chinese wall defense urge that the professional responsibility rules treat all attorneys alike-if there is an
exception for some, then there should be an exception for all.
Opponents say that the exception should not swallow the rule.
Given the inadequacies of discussions in the profession to date,
the lack of empirical evidence available to support either position, and the courts' inability to resolve concerns regarding
abuse in the use of the motion to disqualify, no justification exists at present for judicial acceptance of the Chinese wall as a
defense to vicarious disqualification. The Model Rules may provide the framework for a rare case that will permit a court to
evaluate the adequacy of a particular wall. Meanwhile, those
who would make the case for the wall have much work to do.
Those who oppose the Chinese wall defense must examine the
implications of the defense for traditional standards of confidentiality, consent in the attorney-client relationship, and conflict of
interest.

-Frances Witty Hamermesh

